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SOURCE MATERIAL FOR ARTICLE 85(1) OF
THE EEC TREATYt
JOSEPH J. A. ELLIS*

An interpretationof article 85(1) of the treaty establishing the
European Economic Community-A review and discussion of
the various source materials which reflect the intention of the
drafters of the treaty.
I.

INTRODUCTION

rJHE object of the present report is to study the interpretation of
Article 85(1) 1 of the European Economic Community Treaty,2 and
in particular the meaning of the word "affect" in relation to the words
"prevent, restrict or distort competition."
Having regard, however, to the numerous opinions, often divergent,
which have already been expressed in the literature on the subject of the
rules of competition, both as regards the Coal and Steel Community
Treaty' and as regards the treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, it seems to me that I may be making a useful contribution
by not dealing here with these various opinions but by directing my
discourse towards a study of the other sources of law relating to the interpretation of the Treaty, and in particular to the actes pr6paratoireson the
one hand and to the case law on the other. The object of this paper is
therefore to contribute, by studying these two sources, towards the interpretation to be given to article 85.
j This article is based on a report made by Mr. Ellis in November 1962, at a meeting
of the Institut fUr auslhidisches und internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, at Frankfurt am
Main, Germany. A condensed version of this otherwise unpublished paper appeared in
33 Recueil Dalloz 35 (1963), under the title "L'interprtation du mot 'affecter' dans
r
Partide 85, § 1e , du Trait6 de la Communaut6 6conomique europ~enne par rapport aux

mots 'empicher,' 'restreindre,' ou 'fausser' le jeu de la concurrence."
* Member of the Bar of The Hague, Netherlands.
1. Pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 47, CCH Common Market Rep. Ui2005. The
English text of the Treaty, used for quotations herein, is the semi-official translation
published in 1962 by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, except that for practical
reasons the word "enterprises" has been preferred to "undertakings" or "concerns" as a
translation for the French word "entreprises." This translation with commentaries appears
in the CCH Common Market Reporter.
2. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.TS. 14, CCH Common Market Rep. Ui111
(establishing the European Economic Community) (hereinafter referred to as the EEC
Treaty).
3. Treaty of Paris, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.TS. 140 (establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community).
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I should like to start by making the preliminary observation that
the majority of the actes priparatoireshave not been published, nor were
they submitted to the national parliaments when the bills to ratify the
Rome Treaty were introduced. It can, in fact, hardly be said that any
preparatory document is available which has been officially recognized
as such by an act of each of the signatory governments. Nevertheless, the
report presented by Paul-Henri Spaak,4 who was Chairman of the
Inter-Governmental Committee which was set up during the Messina
Conference on June 1 and 2, 1955, has something of an official character
in that this report was accepted by the Conference of Ministers at Venice
as a basis for the subsequent negotiations which took place at Val Duchesse
near Brussels. Moreover, the various documents produced in the course
of those negotiations are not inaccessible, so that on many points it seems
perfectly possible to establish with certainty what the intentions of the
drafters of the Treaty were and to determine what meaning the various
delegations were seeking to convey when drafting the provisions of the
Treaty.
Examining the subject in this light, this article will seek to elucidate
the text of article 85 (1) objectively and to discover the intentions of those
who drew up the Treaty as it was subsequently ratified by the member
countries of the Community.
II. THE

FUNCTION OF ARTICLE

85

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TREATY

AS A WHOLE

In order to assess the significance of article 85, it is essential to view
it in relation to the Treaty as a whole and in the context in which it has
been placed. Every provision fulfills a function in the general scheme of
the Treaty, and it therefore seems opportune and useful to determine the
function of article 85 in its context.
As already stated, the interpretation given by the present article is
based in the first place on the actes prdparatoires. To assess the function
of article 85 in the context of the EEC Treaty, it is necessary first of all
to have recourse to the Spaak report. The first paragraph of the Introduction to the Spaak report describes the object of the common market:
4. Comit6 Intergouvernemental Cr 6 Par La Conference De Messine, Rapport Des Chefs
De D616gation Aux Ministres Des Affaires Etrang~res, Doc. MAE 120 f/56 (1956) (hereinafter
referred to as the Spaak report). The Spaak report is available at the United Nations
Reference Library in New York City. See also CCH Common Market Rep. IT101.77;
Hallstein, Challenge and Opportunity: Lectures on United Europe, CCH Common Market
Rep. IT9002.06.
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L'objet d'un marchb commun europ6en doit
6tre de crier une vaste zone de politique
6conomique commune, constituant une puissante unit6 de production, et permettant une
expansion continue, une stabilith accrue, un
reltvement ace l~r6 du niveau de vie, et le
div Ioppement de relations harmonieuses
entre les Etats qu'il riunit.5

The object of a European common market
should be to create a vast zone of common
economic policy, constituting a powerful
unit of production and permitting a continuous expansion, an increased stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living,
and the development of harmonious relations between its Member States.

These points are again to be found in the Preamble to the EEC Treaty,'
and they are formally set out in article 2 of the Treaty as constituting
the objectives of the Community. The Spaak report continues by setting
forth the means that will be necessary to attain these objects of the
Community. The second paragraph of the Introduction is worded thus:
Pour atteindre ces objectifs, une fusion des
marches s~paris est une n6cessit6 absolue.
C'est elie qui permet, par la division accrue
du travail, d'liiminer un gaspillage des ressources, et, par une s~curit6 accrue d'approvisionnement, de renoncer
des productions
poursuivies sans considaration de cofit. Dans
une 6conomie en expansion, cette division du
travail s'exprime moins par un d~placement
des productions existantes que par un
daveloppement d'autant plus rapide, dans
l'intrft commun, des productions les plus
6conomiques. L'avantage dans la concurrence
serra d'ailleurs de moins en moins datermin6 par les conditions naturelles. De mime
que l'6nergie atomique donne une plus grande
libert6 h. limplantation des industries, le
march6 commun rendra son plein effet h la
gestion des entreprises et
la qualit6 des
hommes: la raise en commun des ressources
assure l'6galit6 des chances. 7

To attain these objectives, a fusion of the
separate markets is an absolute necessity.
Through the increased division of labor,
such a fusion will enable the wasting of
resources to be eliminated and, through an
increased certainty of supply, the production
of goods regardless of cost to be abandoned.
In an expanding economy, this division of
labor is expressed not so much by an abandonment of existing production programs
as by a relatively more rapid development,
in the common interest, of the most economic production programs. Competitive advantage ill, moreover, be determined less
and less by natural conditions. Just as
atomic energy gives greater freedom in the
siting of industries, so the common market
will do full- justice to the management of
enterprises and to human abilities: the pooling of resources wiill ensure equality of
opportunity.i

This, then, is the starting point: the objectives of the Community are
to be pursued by means of a fusion of the separate markets, that is, in
the language of the Treaty, by the establishment of a common market.
This rule is already expressed in article 2 of the Treaty: "It shall be the
task of the Community, by establishing a Common Market.. . ."I In the
fifth paragraph of its Introduction, the Spaak report sets out the con5. Spaak report at 13. All the translations of the Spaak report and other documents
(except the EEC Treaty) are by the author.
6. 298 U.N.T.S. 14, CCH Common Market Rep. g 111.
7. Spaak report at 13.
8. 298 U.N.T.S. 15, CCH Common Market Rep. 11201.
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ditions which must be fulfilled if the advantages envisaged are to be
derived from this common market:
Ces avantages d'un march6 commun ne
peuvent cependant 8tre obtenus que si des
d~lais sont accord~s et des moyens collectivement d6gag6s pour permettre les adaptations
n~eessaires, s'il est mis fin aux pratiques par
lesquelles ]a concurrence est fauss~e entre
les producteurs, et s'il s'6tablit une coop6ration des Etats pour assurer la stabilit6
mon~taire, 1'expansion 6conomique et le progr~s sodal.9

These advantages of a common market
cannot, however, be obtained unless adequate time is allowed and means are collectively made available to enable the necessary adjustments to be effected, unless practices whereby competition between producers
is distorted are put to an end, and unless
co-operation between States is established
to ensure monetary stability, economic expansion and social progress.9

The condition that an end must be put to practices whereby competition is distorted is fully reflected in article 3 of the Treaty, under subdivision (f), where it is laid down that for the purposes set out in
article 2 the activities of the Community shall include
[T]he establishment of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market
is not distorted .... 10

The relationships between the rules
Treaty, the functioning of the common
Community are expressed most clearly
where the rules of competition are dealt
Comme les probl~mes de l'agriculture le font
d~j L apparaitre, on est amen6 a s'interroger
sur les conditions qui assureront que la fusion des march6s conduise i ]a r~partition
la plus rationnelle des activit~s, au rel~vement g~n~ral du niveau de vie et
& un rythme plus actif d'expansion. Une
politique du march commun pour r~pondre
. ces objectifs essentiels corrige ou complete
le fonctionnement automatique du march6
par des r~gles, des procedures ou des actions
communes ...
Le march6 commun ne conduirait pas par
lui-m~me h Ia r6partition ]a plus rationnelle
des activit~s si les fournisseurs gardaient ]a
possibilt6 d'approvisionner les utilisateurs &
des conditions diff6rentes, en particulier suivant leur nationalit6 ou le pays de leur r~sidence. C'est dans ces termes que se pose le
problme de Ia discrimination.
La discrimination peut prendre les formes

of competition laid down in the
market and the objectives of the
in Title II of the Spaak report,
with in greater detail:

As is already apparent from the problems
surrounding agriculture, one is led to ask
oneself what are the conditions that will
ensure that the fusion of the markets will
lead to the most rational distribution of activities, to the general raising of the standard
of living and to a more active rate of expansion. To meet these essential objectives, a
common market policy would correct or
complete the automatic functioning of the
market by means of rules, procedures or
joint actions ...
The common market would not in Itself
lead to the most rational division of activities if suppliers were still allowed to
supply users on unequal terms, particularly
on terms which differ according to their
nationality or country of residence. This is
where the problem of discrimination arises.
Discrimination can assume a wide variety
of forms; it may, for instance, be reflected

9. Spaak report at 14.
10. EEC Treaty, pt. 1, art. 3, 298 U.N.T.S. 16, CCH Common Market Rep. I 251.
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les plus diverses, par exemple sur la qualit6
ou sur les dlais de livraison. Elle peut, dans
certains cas, aller jusqu'au refus de vendre,
de quelque prtexte qu'il s'entoure. Dans la
plupart des cas, elle s'exercera sur les prix,
soit sous la forme de double prix, c'est-h-dire
de conditions plus on~teuses en dehors du
march national du fournisseur, soit sout la
forme de dumping, dont une condition est
en tout cas que les prix faits soient inf6rieurs
k ceux que pratique l'entreprise sur son mar1
ch6 national.'

in the quality of the goods supplied or in
the delivery times quoted. It may, in certain
cases, even go so far as to amount to a
refusal to sell, whatever the pretext in which
such a refusal may be wrapped. In the
majority of cases, it xill affect prices, either
in the form of double pricing, ix., more
onerous terms outside the supplier's own
national market, or in the form of dumping,
one of the features of which is always that
the prices charged are lower than those
charged by the enterprise on its national
market.11

The report continues:
Dans la p~riode finale l'6linination des
obstacles aux 6changes fern disparaitre les
possibilitEs de discrimination d'entreprises
en concurrence entre dles. Le problme
ne subsiste qe du fait des entreprises
qui, soit par leurs dimensions, soit par
leur spcialisation, soit par les ententes
qu'elles auraient conclues, jouissent d'une
position de monopole. L'action contre la
discrimination rejoint donc celle que sera
n~cessaire contre la formation de monopoles
k 1intrieur du march6 commun. Le trait6
devra sur ces points 6noncer les r~gles de
base ...
Plus g6n&alement, le trait6 devra pr~voir
les moyens d'6viter que des situations ou
des pratiques de monopole mettent en 6chec
les objectifs fondamentaux du march6 commun. A ce titre, it conviendra d'emp~cher:
-une rpartition des marchus par entente
entre les entreprises, parce qu'elle iquivaudrait k en rtablir le cloisonnement;
-- des accords pour limiter la production ou
freiner le progrs technique parce qu'ils
iraient au rebours du progris de la productivit6;
-l'absorption ou la domination du march6
dun produit par une seule entreprise parce
qu'elle Oiminerait Pun des avantages essentiels d'un vaste march6, que est de concilier
l'emploi des techniques de production de
12
masse et le maintien de la concurrence.
11.
12.

Spaak report at 53-54.
Id. at 55-56.

In the final period the elimination of trade
barriers will lead to the disappearance of the
opportunities for discrimination by competing enterprises. The problem only remains
because there are enterprises which, owing
to their size or specialization, or to the

agreements they have concluded, enjoy a
monopoly position. The action against discrimination therefore links up with the
action that will be necessary to counteract
the formation of monopolies within the
common market. The Treaty will have to
lay down basic rules on these points ....
More generally, the Treaty will have to
provide means of ensuring that monopoly

situations or practices do not stand in the
way of the fundamental objectives of the

common market. To this end, it will be
necessary to prevent:

-a

division of markets by agreement be-

tween enterprises, since this would be tantamount to re-establishing the compartmentalization of the market;
to limit production or curb
-agreements
technical progress, because they would run
counter to progress in productivity;
-the absorption or domination of the market for a product by a single enterprise,
since this would eliminate one of the essential advantages of a vast market, namely
that it reconciles the use of mass production
techniques with the maintenance of com2
petition.'

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

The Spaak report therefore sees in the establishment of a common
market the road to be followed in order to realize the aims of the European Economic Community and considers that the elimination of anything which might distort competition is one of the fundamental conditions
for the success of such a common market. This idea is reflected in
Article 2 and in Article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty. The same concept
also appears in the guiding principles for the EEC competition policy as
adopted by the EEC Council of Ministers and published by the European
Commission in the Commission's third General Report to the European
Assembly in May 1960.
The first principle, which is especially relevant, reads as follows:
La r~alisation de ]a politique de concurrence
doit 6tre envisagfe en liaison 6troite avec ]a
poursuite des objectifs gfnfraux et l'accomplissement des autres tiches d6coulant directement du trait6 de Rome.

The competition policy must be pursued In
close harmony with the endeavor to attain
the general objectives and the fulfillment of
the other tasks directly arising out of the
EEC Treaty.

It should be noted, moreover, that the Preamble to the Treaty uses a
different expression, viz., "fair competition":
RECOGNIZING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in
order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition.18

And finally, under point II of its Introduction, the Spaak report speaks
of "the establishment of normal conditions of competition":
[L]'itablissement de conditions normales de
concurrence et le dfveloppement harmonieux
de l'ensemble des 6conomies intfress~s permettent d'envisager de parvenir, par 6tapes
successives,
]a suppression de toutes les
protections qui font actuellement obstacle
aux 6changes et qui morcellent l'6conomie
europ6enne; ces conditions normales de concurrence exigent des r~gles et des procedures
en vue de redresser i'effet des interventions
des Etats ou des situations de monopole; et
elles appellent une action commune pour
6carter les difficult~s de balance des paiements
qui risquent de s'opposer Z l'expansion .... 14

The establishment of normal conditions of
competition and the harmonious development of the whole of the economies concerned make it possible to envisage arriving
by successive stages at the suppression of all
protective measures which currently form an
obstacle to trade and which are responsible
for the fragmentation of the European economy. These normal conditions of competition demand rules and procedures with a
view to counteracting the effect of State
interventions or monopoly situations, and
they call for common action to eliminate the
balance of payments difficulties which
threaten to stand in the way of expan-

sion ....

14

Here then are two positive expressions. It is to be noted that, while
the rules of competition contained in the Treaty are exactly those advocated by the Spaak report with a view to attaining normal conditions of
13.
14.

298 U.N.T.S. 14, CCH Common Market Rep. 1 111. (Emphasis added.)
Spaak report at 15.
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fair competition, the expressions "normal" and "fair" competition are
not to be found either in the ultimate actes pr~paratoiresor in the articles
of the Treaty. The Treaty has summarized these conditions and stated
them more precisely by prescribing that competition must not be distorted. It follows that the authors of the Treaty conceived this negative
expression to cover the essential conditions of competition, necessary for
the functioning of a common market as described in the Spaak report.
This requirement that competition should not be distorted is one which
relates directly to the requirements of a proper functioning of the fused
markets, and this expression therefore ties the elements of fair and normal
competition to the objectives of the common market.
The drafters of the Treaty therefore recognized in article 3(f) the
possibility that competition might be distorted and therefore an element
of risk which would threaten the success of the common market. To
eliminate this danger they drew up the rules of competition, particularly
the rules applying to enterprises.
On the basis of this historic data, it is incontestable that the rules laid
down to ensure that competition is not distorted in the common market
fulfil a derivative and protective function-which consists in preventing
the objectives of the Community from being frustrated by reason of
disturbances in the functioning of the common market resulting from the
distortion of competition within the common market.
There is here a fundamental difference from certain other provisions
of the Treaty which prescribe a positive action; the rules of competition
laid down in articles 85 and 86, and the rules governing competition in
general, have a function which is neither autonomous nor positive, but
derivative and protective. This function was embodied in the Treaty in
order to prevent the distortion of competition from jeopardizing the
functioning of the common market. A further proof of the function of
articles 85 and 86 in the Treaty as a whole is to be found in the first
words of these two articles, which (in the four official texts) read: "[are]
incompatible with the Common Market." 5 This shows also that what
these articles are seeking to prevent and to prohibit are actions or situations incompatible with the conception of a common market. We find
here the direct link with article 3(f); and tracing that article back
to its source, we note the link between the rules of competition and the
general principles of the Spaak report, as expressed in article 2 of the
Treaty.
Some observations will now be made on the views of the Court of Justice
15.

EEC Treaty, pL 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 47, 48, CCH Common Market Rep.

9f 2005, 2101.
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in Luxemburg as regards the relationship between the rules of competition and the fundamental principles in the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty,'" the only treaty on which it has expressed an opinion
in this regard.
The pooling of basic industries by the creation of a common market,
which was the principal object of the ECSC Treaty, shows a certain
parallelism with the establishment, on a much larger scale, of the European Economic Community.
The Court of Justice has on several occasions recognized this parallelism between the two Treaties, and notably between the rules of competition laid down in those Treaties. In Geitling v. Haute AutoritM,17 it
observed:
que si on admet une communaut6 d'inspiration entre les articles 65 du trait6 C.E.CA. et
18
85 du trait6 C.E.E ....

that if it is admitted that there is a common
inspiration between article 65 of the ECSC
Treaty and article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
. . 18

Although this parallelism between the two Treaties should perhaps not
be thought of in too absolute a manner, it would appear to be perfectly
legitimate to consult the case law of the Court of Justice relating to the
ECSC Treaty in cases where the EEC Treaty deals with a certain subject
in a manner more or less analogous to that in which that subject was
dealt with by the provisions of the ECSC Treaty, if only because the
ECSC Treaty antedates the Treaty of Rome by several years and has
already given rise to quite an extensive body of case law.
The close relationship between the basic principles laid down in
Articles 2, 3,,4 and 5 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 65 of that Treaty,
in the sense that this latter article has a protective function towards the
principles of the Coal and Steel Community, has been expressed most
clearly in Geitling v. Haute AutoritM, where the Court held:
qu'elle ne peut admettre Ia suppression des
exigences fondamentales de Particle 65, paragraphe 2, c, exigence qui tendent h sauvegarder sur le march6 oligopolistique du
charbon et de l'acier ]a dose de concurrence
indispensable pour que soient respectdes les
exigences fondamentales 6numdrdes aux articles 2, 3, 4 et 5 du trait6, et notamment

that it cannot allow the suppression of the
fundamental requirements of article 65,
paragraph 2(c), which requirements are dlrected towards safeguarding, on the oligopolistic market for coal and steel, the degree
of competition which is indispensable if the
fundamental requirements enumerated In
articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty are to

16. Treaty of Paris, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (hereinafter referred to as the
ECSC Treaty).
17. Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A., May 18, 1962, 8 Rec. de la jurisprudence do Ia
Cour 165.
18. Id. at 201.
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pour que ne cesse pas d'Etre assur6 "le maintien et le respect de conditions normales de
concurrence. ..."19

be respected, and in particular if "the maintenance and the observance of normal conditions of competition" are not to cease to
be assured. . .. "10

This derivative and protective function of Article 65 of the ECSC
Treaty was also accepted by the Court in its Advisory Opinion of December 13, 1961:
Consid6rant que le manque de pr&ision
quant i Ia nature des accords susceptibles
d'tre autoris~s ne permet pas de constater
si la proposition porte ou ne porte pas
atteinte aux dispositions des articles 2, 3 et
4 du trait6, puisque la rdaction propose
n'exclut pas que parmi les accords ainsi
d~sign~s il y en ait dont l'autorisation ne
serait pas compatible avec un ou plusieurs
de ces articles. ... 20

Whereas the lack of precision as to the
nature of the agreements likely to be authorized does not make it possible to ascertain
whether the proposal does or does not infringe the provisions of articles 2, 3 and
4 of the Treaty, since the proposed wording
does not exclude the possibility that among
the agreements thus designated there may
be some whose authorization would not be
compatible with one or more of those
20
articles.

These pronouncements by the Court of Justice seem to me to give solid
support to the conclusions to which we have come in our study of the
actes priparatoires as regards the function of Article 85 in the EEC
Treaty as a whole.
We have seen from the excerpts from the Spaak report that distorted
competition was partly envisaged as one aspect of the general problem
of discrimination.
Taking up the Spaak report once again as our starting point, we find as
the next step the first version proposed for the EEC Treaty. This document, dated July 17, 1956, bears the reference index "MarchU Commun
17." In this draft we find as Title II: "La Politique du March6 Commun"; Chapter I: "Les r~gles de concurrence"; Section 1: "Les normes
applicables aux entreprises." This section consists of two paragraphs;
paragraph 1: Les discriminations; paragraph 2: Les monopoles. It is
from the rules contained in paragraph 2 that articles 85 through 89 were
derived. Let us now see what became of the rules in paragraph 1. These
were the rules on discrimination, and the first debate on the first draft
was extremely revealing. 2 ' It had been proposed to incorporate in the
Treaty a general ban on discrimination of all kinds. The German delegation proposed that, instead of inserting a general ban on all discrimination:
19. Id. at 214.
20. Modification de l'article 65, du trait6 C.E.C.A., Cour de Justice de la C.E.CA., Dec.
13, 1961, 7 Rec. de la jurisprudence de la Cour 505, 515.
21. See Doc. MAE 252/56.
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a) h 6tablir dans le Trait6, le principe g6n6ral que tout traitement diff6rentiel fond6 sur
]a nationalit et ayant pour effet un dommage ou d~savantage pour une entit6 6conomique est interdit;
b) h. pr6voir dans le Trait6, un contr6le
visant & empecher que les entreprises en
situation de monopole n'abusent de cette
situation; le m6me contr6le serait applicable
aux entreprises en situation d'oligopole et
22
op6rant de mani~re concert~e.

[Vol. 32

a) there should be established In the Treaty
the general principle that any differential
treatment based on nationality and having
the effect of damaging or operating to the
disadvantage of an economic entity is prohibited;
b) provision should be made in the Treaty
for a control aimed at preventing enterprises in a monopoly position from abusing
that position; the same control would be
applicable to enterprises in an oligopolistic
position and operating in a concerted man22
ner.

The Chairman, Dr. Von der Groeben, had prepared a note for the discussion of the same subject at the next meeting of the Common Market
Group.23 This note advocates contemplating separately the problem of
discrimination and the problems of competition. An autonomous (per se)
prohibition of discrimination should, according to this note, be limited to
24
discrimination on the basis of nationality.
In a later note by the Chairman of the Common Market Group,2 5
an account is given of the progress made in the discussions on this subject.
It is stated in particular in this document:
Reste controvers~e Ia question de savoir s'il
faut interdire express6ment, & l'int6rieur du
march6 commun, les discriminations fond~es
sur la nationalit6, et si, dans l'affirmative,
cette interdiction doit 8tre 6nonc6e dans le
chapitre sur les r~gles de concurrence ou
20
dans le pr~ambule du Trait6.

It remains an open question whether discrimination based on nationality should be
expressly forbidden within the common market, and if so, whether such prohibition
should be laid down in the chapter on the
rules of competition or in the Preamble to
20
the Treaty.

The minutes of the meetings held by the Common Market Group from
November 27 through 29, 1956, conclude:
Le Groupe estime, en effet, que le champ
d'application des dispositions concernant ]a
discrimination en raison de la nationalit6
d6passe le domaine des r~gles de concurrence
et que ces dispositions, contenant un des
principes fondamentaux du march6 commun,
auraient leur place au d6but du Trait6, par
27
exemple, comme article 2 his.

The Group believes, in fact, that the field
of application of the provisions concerning
discrimination by reason of nationality goes
beyond the domain of the rules of competition, and that these provisions, containing
one of the fundamental principles of the
common market, should have their place at
the beginning of the Treaty, for instance as
2
article 2 bis. 7

22. Id. at 2.
23. Note on the Rules Relating to Discrimination in Agreements, Oct. 26, 1956, Doc. MAE
468/56.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Note of Nov. 24, 1956, Doc. MAE 627/56.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Doc. MAE 785/56, at 5.
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This quotation shows that the prohibition of discrimination on the
grounds of nationality was considered to be a fundamental principle of
the Community. It was dealt with separately from the provisions concerning the possibility of distorting competition, "which it goes beyond,"
and it was ultimately formulated in article 7, which is one of the articles
expounding the principles of the Treaty. Here once more is solid proof
that the rules of competition in the Treaty do not fulfil any autonomous
and positive function but that they are only there to ensure the realization of the positive aims of the Treaty. To the extent that discrimination is based on nationality, the elimination of such discrimination is
a positive aim of the Treaty. Discrimination in the matter of competition
is considered only as one of the ways of distorting competition, and is
therefore prohibited only insofar as it impedes the functioning of the
common market.
III.

THE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE WORDS "PREVENT,
RESTRICT OR DISTORT COMPETITION

3

We have already seen that the drafters of the Treaty sought to establish rules of competition likely to eliminate the possibilities of competition being distorted. In addition to the sources already mentioned, we
may cite the final Resolution of the Messina Conference, which contains
the following passage:
Sa mise en application (c'est-&-dire le Trait6)
ncessite 1'6tude des questions suivantes: ...
l'P1aboration des r~gles assurant un jeu non
faussg de la concurrence au sein de la Cornmunaut6, qui exciut notamment toute discrimination nationale.

Its (i.e., the Treaty's) application necessitates a study of the following questions: ...
the elaboration of rules to ensure undistorted
competition within the Community, which
will in particular exclude any national discrimination.

The Spaak report also follows the model of the Messina Conference
and, in addition to "the normal conditions of competition," mentions
also the elimination of obstacles, using the word "distort." We have
further seen that the Preamble and article 3(f) of the Treaty fit in
exactly with this idea. It is known that the Preamble and the first articles
of the Treaty received their final form at the end of the negotiations when
the various chapters of the Treaty had already been finalized. In this
respect we may refer to Document MAE 543 f/57 dated February 15,
1957, in which article 3, as drafted on February 14 by the Common
Market Group, provides for:
'16tablissement d'un rgime assurant que
les conditions de concurrence ne soient
fausses dans le marchi
commun, ni par
des pratiques des entreprises, ni par l'exploi-

The establishment of a system ensuring that
the conditions of competition in the common
market are not distorted, either by practices
of enterprises, or by the improper exploita-
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ni par des subventions ou autres mesures
28
6manant des autoritis publiques.
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tion of monopoly situations, or by subsidies
or other measures emanating from the public
authorities. 28

The Committee of Heads of Delegations replaced this text with the
present text of article 3 (f), the decision to do so being taken on February
16, 1957.29 The reason why I am going into such great detail is to show
that article 3(f) was drafted on February 16, 1957, at a time when the
articles on competition had already been adopted by the negotiators.
This fact is relevant here because article 3(f) uses only the word "distorted," whereas article 85 speaks of "prevent, restrict or distort competition."
If article 85 had been drafted after article 3(f) in order to amplify it,
the question might arise as to whether article 85 did not go further
than article 3(f), but since article 3(f) was given its final wording after
the adoption of article 85, it is obvious that the scope of article 85 cannot
go beyond that of article 3 (f), the latter article having been drafted after
the text of article 85 had been finalized.
What significance is to be attached to the addition of the words "prevent" and "restrict" to the word "distort" in the text of article 85?
There is an obvious similarity with the text of article 65 of the ECSC
Treaty, but this fact does not in itself provide very much help when it is
borne in mind that the real significance of article 85 is to prevent distorted
competition from prejudicing the functioning of the common market.
The words "prevent" and "restrict" appear for the first time in Document MAE 468/56, of October 26, 1956. Document Marche Commun
17 of July 17, 1956, proposes only as the text for article 42 (article 85
of the Treaty):
Sont incompatibles avec le march6 commun,
dans la mesure oii le commerce entre Etats
membres s'en trouve affect ....

[The following] shall be incompatible with
the common market to the extent that trade
between Member States is thereby affected.

A counterproposal submitted by the French delegation and introduced
on September 4, 1956, reads:
Sont incompatibles avec le march6 commun
toutes les situations ou pratiques d'ententes
ou de monopole ayant pour objet ou pouvant avoir pour effet d'entraver l'exercice de
la concurrence, en particulier ....
30
28.
29.
30.

Doc. MAE 543f/57, at 5.
See Doc. MAE 586 (rev.)/57.
Doc. MAE 233/56.

[The following] shall be incompatible with
the common market: all agreement or monopoly situations or practices which are
designed to impede the exercise of competition or might have that effect, in particular ....
30
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In his Note on the rules relating to discrimination, agreements and
monopolies, the Chairman of the Common Market Group proposed
the following text as a basis of discussion when the rules of competition
were given a second reading:
Sont interdits (et nuls) tous accords entre
entreprises, toutes decisions d'associations
d'entreprises et toutes pratiques concertes
ayant pour effet ou pour objet d'empicher,
de restreindre ou de fausser le jeu de la
concurrence h l'intirieur du march6 commun,
dans la mesure oii le commerce entre Etats
membres s'en trouve affect6, et notamment
31

[The foloving] shall be prohibited (and
void): all agreements between enterprises,
all decisions by associations of enterprises
and all concerted practices which are designed to prevent, restrict or distort cornpetition within the common market or which
have this effect, insofar as trade between
Member States is thereby affected, in particular . . . .31

During this second reading (November 5-7, 1956), after examining
the various wordings proposed, it was decided to entrust a restricted group
with the task of drafting new draft articles. I have not been able to
examine the documents relating to the work of this restricted group. All
I know is that Dr. Von der Groeben, Chairman of the Common Market
Group, submitted a new compromise draft on November 14, 1956, in
which the words
qui ont pour objet ou pour effet d'empicher,
de restreindre ou de fausser le jeu de la
concurrence ....

which are designed to prevent, restrict or
distort competition . . or which have this
effecL

were retained.3 2 We do not know the motives for adding the words "prevent" and "restrict" to the notion of "distort competition."
Under these circumstances, all that we can do is to take as our basis
a statement made by one of the German members of this Group, Dr.
Thiesing, in the Handbuch ffir Europiische Wirtschaft. In his commentary on article 85, Dr. Thiesing says under point 4:
dass die Verfialschung des Wettbewerbs den
Oberbegriff darstelt, der eine Verhinderung
oder (teilweise) Einschrisnkung des Wettbewerbs mitumfasst.

that the distortion of competition represents
the main concept, comprising also a prevention or (partial) restriction of competition.

Dr. Thiesing affirms, moreover, that this can be deduced from
article 3 (f). This statement is in conformity with what has already been
mentioned above, namely, that article 3(f), which was drafted later, uses
only the word "distort." This leads us to the conclusion that article 3 (f)
is still the dominant article, and that the idea underlying article 85 is
the notion of "distorting competition," and that the complete or partial
31.
32.

Doc. L
468/56.
Doc. MAE 525/56.
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limitation of competition expressed by the words "prevent" and "restrict"
merely constitutes an example of one way of distorting competition.
A systematic interpretation of the Treaty on this point confirms this
statement by Dr. Thiesing. The proper functioning of the common
market may also be threatened by elements which distort competition
other than those specifically referred to in article 85. One of these elements is mentioned in article 92:
[A]ny aid granted by a Member State

. . .

which distorts or threatens to distort

competition by favoring certain enterprises or the production of certain goods ....

a'

Such aid is declared to be incompatible with the common market. It will
be noted that this article, the function of which is completely identical
with that of article 85, uses only the word "distort."
Then, in article 101, mention is made of another element which may
threaten the proper functioning of the common market by distorting competition, viz., a discrepancy between the legislative or administrative provisions of Member States. This article provides that where the Commission finds that such a discrepancy
is interfering with competition within the Common Market and consequently producing distortions
which need to be eliminated, it shall consult the Member States
34
concerned.

Again, it is only a question here of discrepancies which distort competition, while this article, too, has a function similar to that of article 85.
In the same spirit, article 107(2) declares that
if a Member State makes an alteration in its rate of exchange which is incompatible
with the objectives laid down in Article 104 and which seriously distorts conditions
of competition, the Commission may . . .

Finally, article 112 reflects the same anxiety on the part of the authors
of the Treaty to safeguard the functioning of the common market from
being jeopardized by distorted competition, providing that
they [the Member States] shall, before the end of the transitional period, progressively harmonize the systems under which aid is granted to exports to third countries,
to the extent necessary to ensure
that competition between enterprises in the Com36
munity shall not be distorted.
33.

EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 3, art. 92, 298 U.N.T.S. 51, CCH Common Market

Rep. ff 2901.

34. EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 3, art. 101, 298 U.N.T.S. 54, CCH Common Market
Rep. Uf
3401.

35. EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 2, ch. 2, art. 107(2), 298 U.N.T.S. 57, CCH Common Market
Rep. 113851.
36. EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 2, ch. 3, art. 112, 298 U.N.T.S. 59, CCH Common Market
Rep. U4401.
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The above shows that whenever the basic rule laid down in article 3(f)
is applied in other articles of the Treaty, it is a question solely of protecting the functioning of the common market from distorted competition.
It is difficult, therefore, to conceive that article 85 would form an exception to this rule in that the words "restrict" and "prevent" have been
added to the word "distort." It follows, therefore, that these additions
have no meaning of their own but are merely terms already comprised
within the notion "distort."
We are left now with the problem of what significance is to be attached
to the word "distort" in article 85(1). As we have seen, the rule that
competition in the common market must not be distorted was inserted
in the Treaty to protect the functioning of the common market.
As the Spaak report puts it, the common market results in the first
place from a fusion of the separate markets. This fusion is intended to
put an end to the economic fragmentation of Europe. This wider market
will make it possible to eliminate the wasting of resources and to abandon
production programs pursued regardless of cost. The Spaak report continues in its Introduction:
Cette fusion des marchss ouvre des d~bouchs assez vastes pour l'emploi des techniques
les plus modernes. 1I existe d~j5 des productions exigeant des moyens si 6normes ou des
machines d'un rendement tel qu'elles ne sont
plus & la mesure d'un march6 national
isol6. Mais surtout, dans beaucoup de
branches d'industrie, les marchis nationaux
n'offrent la chance d'atteindre la dimension
optima qu'. des entreprises qui disposeraient
d'un monopole de fait. La force d'un vaste
march6, c'est de concilier la production de
masse et l'absence de monopole.
Les protections qui 61iminent la concurrence extkrieure ont d'ailleurs pour le progrs de la production et le rel~vement du
niveau de vie une consequences particuliirement novices: les facilits et l'incitation
qu'elles donnent i l'imination de la concurrence interne. Dans un march6 plus vaste,
il n'est plus possible d'organiser le maintien
de modes d'exploitation vieillis qui d6terminent h la fois des prix 6lev~s et des
salaires has; et les entreprises, au lieu de
priserver des positions immobiles, sont soumises b. une pression permanente pour investir, en vue de davelopper a production,

This fusion of markets will open up vast
outlets for the employment of the latest
techniques. There are already some types of
production calling for such huge resources
or for machines with such a large output
that they are no longer within the capability
of a single national market. But above all,
in many branches of industry, the national
markets offer the chance of attaining optimum dimensions only to enterprises having
a de facto monopoly. The strength of a vast
market lies in the fact that it reconciles mass
production with the absence of monopoly.
Systems of protection which eliminate
outside competition have, moreover, particularly harmful consequences on the progress of production and the raising of the
standard of living, viz., the facilities and the
incentive that they provide for the elimination of internal competition. In a vaster
market, it will no longer be possible to
organize the maintenance of outmoded operating methods which lead to high prices and
low wages; while enterprises, instead of
preserving static positions, uill be under
constant pressure to invest, with a view to
developing production, improving quality
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d'am~liorer la qualit6 et de moderniser l'exploitation: il leur faut progresser pour se
37
maintenir.
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and modernizing their operations: they will
have to progress in order to keep going.,3 7

This economic transformation of Europe is one essential condition (the
progressive approximation of the economic policies of the Member States
is the other) for the realization of the fundamental objectives of the Community as expressed in article 2 of the Treaty.
But, as the Spaak report remarks:
[O]n est amen6 h s'interroger sur les conditions qui assureront que ]a fusion des march6s conduise A ]a repartition ]a plus rationnelle des activit6s, au relvement g~nral du
niveau de vie et a un rythme plus actif
d'expansion. Une politique du march6 commun pour r6pondre h ces objectifs essentiels
corrige ou complete le fonctionnement automatique du march6 par des rbgles, des proc~dures ou des actions communes. 38

One is led to ask oneself what are the conditions that will ensure that tie fusion of
the markets will lead to the most rational
distribution of activities, to the general raising of the standard of living and to a more
active rate of expansion. To meet these
essential objectives, a common market policy
would correct or complete the automatic
functioning of the market by means of rules,
procedures or joint actions.88

And then:
Le march6 commun ne conduirait pas luimme &]a r~partition ]a plus rationnelle des
activit~s . . .. 39

The common market would not In itself lead
to the most rational division of activities.30

Corrective measures will be necessary to eliminate, for example, double
pricing, which has the same effect as customs duties; the dumping practices which endanger economically sound production methods; and finally
all the industrial arrangements which tend to substitute market sharing
for the compartmentalization of the market.
This then is the functioning of the common market as envisaged by
the authors of the Treaty: it was to be a real and perfect fusion of the
separate markets, "a pooling of resources to ensure equality of opportunity." This functioning of the common market was to be preserved
from all disturbances, whether they came from national governments or
from industry.
By declaring all agreements between enterprises which "distort competition" to be incompatible with the common market, article 85(1) can
have no other object, in the conception of the Spaak report and in accordance with the general scheme of the Treaty, than to protect this
functioning of the common market. The notion of "distorting competition," therefore, refers to agreements which prejudice the functioning
37. Spaak Report at 13-14.
38. Id. at 53.
39. Ibid.
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of the common market as a fusion of the separate markets, this fusion
being one of the two essential conditions for attaining the objectives of the
Community. It follows that article 85 does not apply to any impediment
to competition, but only to those impediments that are incompatible with
the conception of a common market, that is to say, incompatible with a
a real and complete fusion of six separate markets.
We have already seen that the rules of competition in the EEC Treaty
have a protective, indeed defensive, function. Their raison d'gtre is to
safeguard an undisturbed functioning of the common market so that the
fundamental objectives shall not be thwarted by distorted competition
between enterprises.
Before tackling the question of the meaning of the word "affect," it
may be well to say a few words about article 85(3).1 °
Neither the Spaak report nor Common Market Document 17 of July 17,
1956, allow for the possibility of an exception to the protective rule incorporated in article 85(1). It was once again Dr. Von der Groeben,
Chairman of the Common Market Group, who, in his Note of October 26,
1956, proposed inserting a second paragraph in article 42 (now article 85)
reading as follows:
Sont toutefois autoriss (et valables)

les

accords entre entreprises et les dcisions
d'associations d'entreprises qui ont W d6claris & la Commission (en vue de leur enregistrement) et au sujet desquels le d&Jarant pent fournir la preuve qu'ils contribuent,
d'une fagon profitant 6galement aux utilisateurs, ? am6liorer la production ou la distribution des produits ou h promouvoir le
progres technique on 6conomique sans imposer aux entreprises intresses des restrictions qui ne sont pas indispensables & la
r6alisation de ces objectifs, et sans leur
donner la possibilit6, pour une partie substantielle des produits en cause, de fixer les
prix, de limiter la production ou les d6bouch6s ou d'bIiminer la concurrence d'autres
entreprises. 41

Agreements between enterprises and dedsions by associations of enterprises shall
nevertheless be authorized (and valid) if they
have been declared to the Commission (with
a view to their registration) and the declarant can furnish proof that, in a manner
which is equally of benefit to consumers,
they help to improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote technical
or economic progress, without subjecting the
enterprises in question to any restrictions
which are not indispensable to the achievement of these objectives and without enabling them to fix prices, limit production or
markets or eliminate the competition of
other enterprises in respect of a substantial
part of the goods concerned. 41

It is interesting to note that the possibility of an exception being made
to the protective rule of article 85(1) is not linked with the prohibitive
character attaching to that rule but with the principle of incompatibility
with the common market of industrial agreements which distort compe40.
41.

EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 48, CCH Common Market Rep. f 20S1.
Doc. MA.E 468/56, at 6.
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tition. In his compromise proposal of November 14, 1956, the Chairman
of the Common Market Group reproduced in his draft article 42(1)
the text of Common Market Document 17 reading:
Sont incompatibles avec le march6 commun

[The following] shall be incompatible with

tous accords ....

the common market: all agreements ....

But nevertheless he proposed that an additional convention should
regulate:
notamment les cas d'exception de l'article
42 ainsi que ]a question de savoir si les
accords entre entreprises et les d6cisions
d'associations d'entreprises qui rentrent dans
le cadre de ces exceptions, doivent 6tre d6clar~s ZLla Commission en vue de leur
enregistrement, ou s'ils doivent 6tre autoriss
par la Commission. 42

In particular, the exceptions to article 42 and
the question whether agreements between
enterprises and decisions by associations of
enterprises which come within the scope of
these exceptions should be declared to the
Commission with a view to their registration,
or whether they should be authorized by
the Commission. 42

In the draft text drawn up by the Common Market Group in the course
of its meeting of November 28, 1956, the word "prohibited" was again
added to the text of article 42(1), while at the same time the possibility
of exception was inserted in paragraph 2 of that article:
Peuvent 6tre dclar~s valables les accords
. . . 43

Agreements

. .

may be declared valid

43

The Group therefore seems to me to have come to the conclusion that
the possibility of exception relates in principle to the rule of incompatibility with the common market. As is shown by the Spaak report and
the draft article 42 in Common Market Document 17, both of which
adopted only the criterion of incompatibility, it is this criterion which
is the basic one in article 85; the prohibition and the nullity are only its
consequences.
This demonstrates that article 85 (3) contains the possibility of making
an exception to the incompatibility rule. The protective rule is aimed at
ensuring an undisturbed functioning of the common market, while this
functioning of the common market is in turn the necessary basis for
attaining the objects of the Community as envisaged in article 2; the
exceptions provided for in article 85(3), therefore, to some extent set
aside this protective rule, which is only comprehensible if those exceptions
are predicated on a higher interest. This interest cannot be anything
other than the fundamental objects of the Treaty, viz., the attaining of
the objects of the Community.
The applicability of article 85(3) is reserved, again on certain con42. Doc. MAE 541/56, at 4.
43.

Doc. MAE 657/56.
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ditions, to agreements which help "to improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote technical or economic progress. ... ""
The improvement of production and distribution and the advancement
of technical and economic progress are among the objectives which, as
we have seen, were mentioned in the Introduction to the Spaak report and
which are reflected in article 2 of the Treaty.
The exception to the rule protecting the functioning of the common
market or, in other words, the applicability of article 85(3), therefore
concerns only those agreements that are so useful for the attainment of
the objectives of the Treaty that, though they have to be judged incompatible with the proper functioning of the common market, their prohibition would be contrary to the fundamental objectives of the Community. It is for this reason that the rule of article 85(1) has to give way to
such extent as may be necessary.
The function of article 85(3), viewed within the framework of the
Treaty as a whole, therefore underlines the derivative function of article
85(1). Article 85(1) constitutes only a means of safeguarding the advantages to be obtained from a fusion of the separate markets. But in
its turn, this fusion is only a means of realizing the fundamental objectives
of the Treaty, namely the objects of the Community. The rule of article
85(1) and, in consequence, the protection of the functioning of this common market, have to give way as soon as and insofar as they might
become prejudicial to the attainment of these fundamental objectives of
the Treaty to which they are always subordinate.
IV. HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WORD "AFFECT"
Starting once again with the Spaak report, we find the following observation:
Les r~gles et les procedures communes pourront 8tre limitdes aux pratiques qui affecteraient le commerce inter Etats, laissant aux
Etats nationaux eux-m~mes le soin d'emp6cher des discriminations ou la formation
45
d'ententes i effet purement local.

The common rules and procedures can be
limited to the practices which would affect
inter-State trade, leaving it to the national States themselves to prevent discrimination or agreements having a purely local
45
effect.

Originally, therefore, the function of the expression "affect trade between Member States" was to circumscribe the field of application of the
rules of competition of the EEC Treaty. As we have seen previously, the
rules of competition were only inserted to ensure that the functioning of
the common market would not be prejudiced by a distortion of competition within that market. Competition can be distorted either in the in44.
45.

EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1,298 U.N.TS. 48, CCH Common Market Rep. 9 2051.
Spaak Report at 55.
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ternal trade of the various national markets or in the trade between
Member States. In the Spaak report, we have seen that the rules of competition envisaged were aimed at preventing competition from being distorted insofar as such distortion might occur in the trade between Member
States. It is for this reason that the idea of "affecting trade between
States" was originally envisaged as a limit imposed on the field of applicability of the EEC Treaty.
It is very interesting and enlightening to follow the development of
this thesis throughout the subsequent discussions on the various drafts
for the wording of the Treaty. The first draft of article 85, which is to
be found in Common Market Document No. 17, under article 42, reads
as follows:
Sont incompatibles avec le March6 Commun,
dans la mesure oii le commerce entre Etats
Membres s'en trouve affect6 . . . .

[The following] shall be incompatible with
the Common Market to the extent that
trade between Member States is thereby
affected ....

This draft thus followed to the letter the criteria set out in the Spaak
report. Then came a proposal from the French delegation, contained in
Document MAE 233/'56 of September 4, 1956, in which that delegation
sought to make a distinction between the field of applicability of the
Treaty and the jurisdiction of the European Commission. According to
the French version, the Treaty would be applicable whenever competition
was distorted, whether within the limits of the national market or in the
trade between Member States. The national governments would have to
assume the task of eliminating the obstacles in the field of the national
markets, while the European Commission would be responsible for taking
measures to prevent competition from being distorted in the trade between
Member States. The national governments would be entitled to approach
the European Commission should they find that there were obstacles in the
trade between the States. The French proposal was worded as follows:
Sont incompatibles avec le narch6 commun
toutes les situations ou pratiques d'ententes
ou de monopole ayant pour objet ou pouvant avoir pour affet d'entraver l'exercice
de la concurrence, en particulier . . . .
Lorsque les situations ou pratiques vis~es
k Particle X + 2 affectent le commerce
entre deux ou pIusieurs Etats membres,
chacun d'eux peut saisir ]a Commission pour
violation de ces dispositions. La Commission
46
peut 6galement se saisir d'office.

46.

Doc. MAE 233/56.

[The following] shall be incompatible with
the Common Market: all agreement or
monopoly situations or practices which
are designed to impede the exercise of competition or might have that effect, In particular ....
When the situations or practices referred
to in article X + 2 affect the trade between
two or more Member States, any of them
may refer the matter to the Commission as
constituting a violation of these provisions.
The Commission may also consider such
40
matters proprio motu.
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It should be mentioned, incidentally, that article X + 2 uses the words
"impede the exercise of competition," which were borrowed from article
59 bis of the French Price Ordinance of 1945, except that that Ordinance
speaks of the "full exercise of competition" whereas the French proposal
uses in article X + 2 the expression "the exercise of competition." This
is fully in line with what has already been said, namely that those who
drafted the Treaty did not lay down any rule whereby competition had
to be unlimited, but prescribed only that competition should not be distorted. Seen from this angle, it is perfectly logical that the French delegation should not demand "the full exercise of competition," but only "the
exercise of competition."
In the Note by the Chairman of the Common Market Group, dated
October 26, 1956, in which the results are given of the discussions following the first reading of the rules of competition, we then find the
following observations:
Several delegations are of the opinion that
the provisions of the Treaty should deal only
with agreements and monopolies which affect
the trade between two or more Member
States. On the other hand, one delegation

Plusieurs dl6.gations estiment que les dispositions du Traith ne devraient viser que les
ententes et les monopoles que affectent le
commerce entre deux ou plusieurs Etats
Membres. En revanche, une d06gation (c'est-

47
. . . desire
k-dire la d~lagation franqais)

[i.e. the French delegation]i7 . . . deires

ne faire d~pendre de cette condition que la
possibilit6 de saisir les institutions de la
Communaut6 d'une violation des dispositions
en question, sans sugg~rer en mime temps
une limitation du champ d'application de ces
derni~res. On pent toutefois se demander
s'il est indispensable de pr6voir, en vue de
Pouverture du march6 commun, des dispositions relatives aux ententes et aux monopoles qui n'affectent pas le commerce entre

that this condition should only give rise to
the possibility of referring a violation of the
provisions in question to the institutions of
the Community, without at the same time
suggesting any limitation of the field of
application of those provisions. It may be
wondered, however, whether it is indispensable, with a view to the opening of the
common market, to lay down provisions
relating to agreements and monopolies which

les Etats membres, et si ces dispositions
auront une importance pratique, au cas oh
l'on exciut k priori la possibilit6 de saisir la
Commission, le Conseil on la Cour de Justice de la Communaut6 en cas d'infraction.

do not affect the trade between Member
States, and whether such provisions would
have any practical importance if the possibility of referring infringements to the
Commission, the Council or the Court of
Justice of the Community were excluded

a priori.

We see here that the other delegations did not accept the French thesis
because they had come to the conclusion that it would be useless to make
the Treaty applicable to impediments to competition which operated
only on the national markets and did not affect the trade between Member States, if the European Commission was in any case to have jurisdi47. See Doc. MAE 233/56, art. X + 3, ff 1.
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tion only as regards impediments in this latter category. They therefore
judged it to be more logical to limit the field of application of the Treaty
itself to those impediments to competition which affect the trade between
Member States.
The wording proposed by the Chairman of the Common Market
Group at the end of these debates defined the criterion thus:
dans la mesure ofi le commerce entre Etats
Membres s'en trouve affect6 . . 48

to the extent that trade between Member
States is thereby affected . .. .48

In a draft put forward during the second reading of the rules of
competition, dated November 14, 1956, the Chairman of the Common
Market Group proposed a broader formula:
qui sont susceptibles d'affecter le commerce
entre les Etats Membres . . . .49

liable to affect
States . .. .49

trade

between

Member

This is the formula which carried the day and which was adopted in the
final wording of the Treaty.
This historical review of the expression "affect trade between Member States" thus shows that the sole function of this expression was to
circumscribe and delimit the field of application of the Treaty.
The notion "affect trade between Member States" delimits the field
of application of the rule that competition within the common market
must not be distorted, and it consequently constitutes a qualification of
that rule. Article 85(1) is directed only to agreements which are incompatible with the functioning of the common market as being a fusion
of the separate markets. By their nature, these will on the whole only
be agreements which affect the trade between Member States. The addition of the words "which are liable to affect trade between Member
States" therefore underlines the significance to be attributed to the word
"distort," taken in conjunction with "incompatible with the Common
Market." The word "affect" is not an autonomous element of article 85,
but a qualification of the function of the word "distort" in article 85,
namely the function of protecting the functioning of the common market. The impediments to competition which fall within the scope of the
term "affect" are impediments which in fact are already covered by the
notion "distort."
In the light of the foregoing, there would not be much point in exploring the question whether a neutral or a pejorative meaning should
be attributed to the word "affect" in article 85; it seems obvious that
48.
49.

Doc. MAE 468/56, at 6.
Doc. MAE 541/56, at 2. (Emphasis added.)

1963)

EEC TREATY

the word "affect," related as it is to the notions "distort" and "incompatible," is equally charged with a pejorative meaning.
It is therefore perfectly logical that the word "affecter" should have
been used in the French text, just as the word "beeintrichtigen" (impair or prejudice) is used in the German text, and not in the word "beeinfliissen" (influence) as used in the German cartel law. It is logical
also that the Dutch text of the Treaty should speak of "ongunstig
be'fnvloeden" (adversely influence) and that the Italian text should have
"pregiudicare" (prejudice), while it is interesting to note that the linguistic group which compared the four texts when the final draft of the
Treaty had been completed had no doubts, according to its reports, about
the correctness of these translations.
Articles 85 and 86 are not the only passages in which the word
"affect" has been employed in the Treaty. In article 90, paragraph 2,
we find in the last sentence:
The development of trade shall not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary
to the interests of the Community. 50
Here the word "affect" ("affecter" in the French text) is obviously used
in a pejorative sense. The German text of the Treaty here again uses
the word "beeintriichtigen." The Italian text employs the word "compromesso" (compromised), while the Dutch text says: "beinvloed in een
mate, die strijdig is met het belang van de Gemeenschap" (influenced
to an extent contrary to the interests of the Community).
The same applies to the word "affecter" in article 92, which deals with
State aid declared to be incompatible with the Common Market
in so far as it adversely affects trade between Member States ....51
There is no counterpart in the French text to the word "adversely"; but
here again, the only possible meaning of the word "affecter" is a
pejorative one.
Article 224 also contains the word "affect" which is used there twice.
The article deals with the steps to be taken by a State in the event of
serious internal disturbances "affecting law and order" ("affectant l'ordre
public"). Here the intention is so plainly evident that the German text
says simply: "Stbrung der Wffentlichen Ordnung" (disturbance of public
order). The Italian text says: "che turbino l'ordine publico" (which
disturb public order). And the Dutch text: "waardoor de openbare
50. EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 2, art. 90, 298 U.N.TS. 50, CCH Common Market
Rep. ff 2351. (Emphasis added.)
51. EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 3, art. 92, 298 U.N.T.S. 51, CCH Common Market
Rep. ff 2901. (Emphasis added.)
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orde wordt verstoord" (whereby public order is disturbed). This article
goes on to stipulate that, in the event of one of them taking such
emergency measures, the Member States shall consult one another with
a view to preventing the operation of the Common Market from being
"affected" by those measures. Here again, it is not possible to understand the word "affect" otherwise than in a pejorative sense.
There is nowhere a passage in the Treaty where the word "affect"
is used in a neutral sense. Systematic interpretation therefore leads to
the conclusion that in articles 85 and 86, where it was necessary to define a qualification for the types of impediments covered by the rules of
competition to be laid down in the EEC Treaty, this same word "affect"
is used in a pejorative sense just as it is wherever else the word "affecter"
has been used in the French text of the Treaty.
The decision by the Court of Justice in Socidt4 Kledingverkoopbedrijj
de Geus v. Bosch,52 affirming that it should not be automatically concluded
that export bans are prohibited under article 85, seems to be fully predicated on the conception that the word "affect" is not a neutral term,
because export bans in all probability always exert some influence on
the trade between Member States in that they are directly related to
that trade. But it is only by construing the term "affect" in a pejorative
sense that the Court can come to such a conclusion. 3
I would refer, in conclusion, to the letter dated July 31, 1959, addressed by the President of the European Commission to the President of
the Assembly on the question whether the cartel agreement authorized
by the German Government, whereby the petroleum industry had agreed
not to compete with the coal industry in the matter of prices and to refrain
for a certain period from attracting new customers from among those
who had hitherto been purchasers of coal, did or did not come within
the terms of article 85(1) of the Treaty. Here is the text of the letter,
as reproduced in the Report of the European Assembly's Internal Market Committee (the Darras report), A.P.E. Number 51 of September
1959:
Le ministre f~dral de l'6conomie a pris
contact avec ]a Commission de ]a CEE avant
d'autoriser ce cartel et iI a fait valoir qu'il
ne tombait pas sous le coup des interdictions de l'article 85 du trait6 de ]a CEE.
Pour appr~der le cas d'esp~ce, ]a Commis-

The Federal Minister of Economics approached the EEC Commission before authorizing this cartel and submitted that It
did not fall within the scope of the prohibitions laid down in article 85 of the EEC
Treaty.

52. Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A., April 6, 1962, 8 Rec. de ]a jurisprudence do Ia Cour
89, CCH Common Market Rep. ff 8003.
53. It should be noted that the original text of the Bosch case was in Dutch, and in that
text the words used are "ongunstig beinvloeden" (adversely influence).
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sion est partie du point de vue qu'il y avait
lieu, pour prendre une dcision sur le point
de savoir si ce cartel 6tait de nature i
affecter le commerce entre les Etats membres, de ne pas prendre en consid6ration la
clause du contrat selon laquelle tous les
producteurs, importateurs et commeriants
d'hule combustible peuvent adhrer au cartel.
L'adhsion d'autres entreprises cr~erait un
fait nouveau et pourrait, le cas 6chant, provoquer une revision de la question. D~s lors,
la Commission s'est born~e i verifier si la
mise en oeuvre de l'entente, telle qu'ele est
pr~vue aux termes de la demande, affectait
le commerce entre les Etats membres.
La Commission n'a pu relever aucune
r6percussion directe de cette entente sur le
commerce entre les Etats membres. De l'avis
de la Commission, les effets indirects dont
it faudrait 6ventuellement tenir compte, sont
trop limits pour qu'on puisse y voir une
atteinte au commerce entre les Etats membres. D~s lors, la Commission n'a aucune
raison de considrer que les conditions pr6vues a. Particle 85-1 du trait6 de la CEE
sont r~alisies.

In assessing this specific case, the Commission adopted the standpoint that, in deciding
whether this cartel w%-as
of such a nature as
to affect the trade between Member States,
it should not take into consideration the
clause of the contract whereby all producers,
importers and dealers in fuel oils may join
the cartel. If other enterprises were to join,
this would create a new fact and might in
certain cases lead to a review of the whole
matter. The Commission accordingly confined itself to ascertaining whether the implementation of the agreement as envimged
in the terms of the request affected the
trade between Member States.
The Commission has been unable to find
any direct repercussion of this agreement
on the trade between Member States. In the
opinion of the Commission, the indirect
effects which it might be necessary to take
into account are too limited for it to be
possible to see in them an impairment of
the trade between Member States. The Commission therefore has no reason for finding
that the conditions referred to in Article
85(1) of the EEC Treaty have been fulfilled.

It is particularly the last paragraph of this quotation which is interesting, since it speaks of a "direct repercussion of this agreement on the
trade between Member States" and declares that the indirect effects
"are too limited for it to be possible to see in them an impairment of the
trade between Member States." This view expressed by the European
Commission, and particularly the use of the word "impairment"
(French: "atteinte") shows that the European Commission also interprets the word "affect" in a pejorative sense.
V.

SIGNIFICANCE OF ARTICLE

85(3)

Although I have now concluded my discourse proper, this is perhaps
a suitable moment for making one or two observations on the task of the
Commission in carrying out article 85(3).
It has often been maintained that if article 85(1) applied only to
restrictive agreements whose effect would be to constitute an obstacle
to the proper functioning of the common market, article 85(3) would
become devoid of meaning. This reasoning purports to show that article
85(3) is intended to enable the Commission to grant exemptions in
cases where, however restrictive it may be, an agreement could never-
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theless be held to be compatible with the common market by reason of
its beneficial long-term effects.
Now this reasoning, as I have shown earlier in this article, omits to
distinguish between, on the one hand, the objects of the Community,
and, on the other, the proper functioning of the common market necessary for the attainment of those objects. It should be fully realized
that the proper functioning of the common market is not the final aim
of the Treaty, but only a means of ensuring the success of the Community. That is why it may happen in special cases, which I agree are
likely to be rather rare, that application of the rules intended to protect
the functioning of the common market would not be conducive to the
fundamental objectives of the Treaty as set forth in article 2. These
are cases in which the mechanism of the common market is inadequate
to attain these objectives by itself.
To avoid any conflict between the fundamental provisions of article
2 and the provisions intended to protect the functioning of the common
market, the Treaty has provided the possibility of setting aside this
protective rule which is directed only at an object which is always subordinate to the fundamental objectives of the Community, in order that
the latter may prevail. This then is the significance of article 85(3). It
entrusts to the Commission the task of applying the Treaty as a whole
in matters of competition, and of deciding, in specific cases, whether
the objectives of the Community would be better served by maintaining
the unencumbered mechanism of the common market, or whether those
objectives require that protection of the functioning of the common
market be occasionally set aside.
This task, based on the conception that the fundamental principles of
the Treaty and the rules elaborating those principles form an indivisible
whole and should be applied as such, 54 implies that the decisions taken
under article 85(3) are decisions of a political character which are truly
of the utmost importance from the point of view of the execution of the
Treaty.
Another example, equally characteristic, in which the Commission is
54. The Court has on a number of occasions recognized, as far as the ECSC Treaty Is
concerned, this fundamental coherence between the principles underlying the Treaty and the
provisions elaborating these provisions. See Modification de 'article 65 du trait6 C.E.C.A.,
Cour de Justice de ]a C.E.C.A., Dec. 13, 1961, 7 Rec. de ]a jurisprudence de ]a Cour, 505,
515 (advisory opinion); Geitling v. Haute Autorit6, Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A., May
18, 1962, 8 Rec. de ]a jurisprudence de ]a Cour 165, 201; Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux
v. Haute Autorit6, Cour de Justice de ]a C.E.C.A., June 21, 1958, 4 Rec. de ]a jurisprudence
de la Cour 223; Gouvernement de ]a R~publique Franqaise v. Haute Autorit6, Cour de
Justice de ]a C.E.C.A., Dec. 21, 1954, 1 Rec. de ]a jurisprudence de ]a Cour 7.
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entrusted with the task of weighing the interest of the Community
against the interests subordinate to it, is to be found in article 90(2).
This provision relaxes the rules of competition of the Treaty for enterprises entrusted with the management of services of general economic
interest. But article 90(3) imposes on the Commission a supervisory
function, authorizing it to order the cessation of any action of this kind
and to issue directives or decisions to Member States as soon as the
interests, not of the common market, but of the Community, are thereby
affected.
A better example could scarcely be given of the difference between
the objectives of the common market and the mission of the Community.
But it would be quite illogical to suggest that it is only in the case of the
types of enterprise mentioned in article 90(2) that circumstances may
arise in which the interests of the Community do not coincide with the
perfect functioning of the common market.
Viewed in this light, the function of the Commission falls into its true
perspective. If article 85(1) had been conceived solely in order that
restrictive agreements should be prohibited by the mere fact of their
restrictive character, even if they were compatible with the common
market-an intepretation which would not be in accordance either with
the text of article 85(1) or with the Spaak report-the work of the
European Commission would be reduced to summarizing and studying
numerous agreements, even if they did not in any way concern the
functioning of the common market, simply because they contained restrictive provisions. But this is not work which ought to be done by the
highest executive body in Europe.
The task of the Commission under the terms of article 85(3) of the
Treaty is, on the other hand, analogous to the task entrusted to it under
article 90(2), i.e., of assuming responsibility for deciding in particular
and exceptional cases whether there are grounds for departing from the
normal functioning of the common market with a view to better serving
the higher aim of the Community. Such a task could only be entrusted
to the highest executive body in Europe because it involves assuming
full responsibility for assessing the aims of the Community and for laying down a policy in conformity with those aims. It is a task which requires the Commission to make thorough and detailed studies of certain
important cases and to make full use of its powers of investigation.
Viewing the function of the Commission in this light, agreements
which infringed article 85(1) would obviously continue to fall within the
competence of the Commission and the latter would have full powers to
institute inquiries and prosecutions whenever and wherever necessary.
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But the decisions taken in virtue of article 85(3) would contain declarations of high policy, and the task of the European Commission would
not be reduced to answering the question whether such private agreements were restrictive in the technical sense although compatible with
the common market.
I can think of no better way of elucidating the true significance of the
function entrusted to the Commission by article 85(3) than by citing
the following successive steps in the reasoning on which the Court of
Justice based its judgment Geitling v. Haute AutoritJ,'u with which I
will conclude:
Attendu que le trait6 instituant ]a Communaut6 europ~enne du charbon et de l'acier n'a
pas mdconnu l'voluton technique et commerciale qui augmente constamment ]a dimension des unit~s 6conomiques et tend &
donner, chaque jour davantage, au march6
du charbon et de l'acier un caract~re oligopolistique;
que les dispositions du paragraphe 2 de
l'article 65 et du paragraphe 2 de Particle 66
marquent la volont6 des auteurs du trait6 de
ne pas faire obstacle & cette 6volution, sous
]a condition qu'elle serve les fins du trait6
et notamment qu'elle laisse subsister, entre
grandes unites, ]a dose de concurrence ndcessaire pour que soit sauvegard~e l'exigence
fondamentale de Particle 2, imposant "l'tablissement progressif de conditions assurant
par elles-m~mes ]a repartition la plus rationnelle de la production au niveau de productivit6 le plus 6lev6, tout en sauvegardant
la continuit6 de 1'emploi et en 6vitant de
provoquer, dans les 6conomies des Etats
membres, des troubles fondamentaux et persistants";
que cette preoccupation de sauvegarder
une certaine dose de concurrence dans le
regime de concurrence imparfaite qui est
celui du charbon et de l'acier a inspir6
manifestement i'une des conditions impos~es
par le paragraphe 2 de Particle 65 aux accords de vente en commun susceptibles d'Utre
autoris6s, 6. savoir qu'ils ne donnent pas aux
entreprises int~ress~es le pouvoir de d6ter-

Whereas the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community has not
failed to recognize the technical and commercial evolution which is constantly increasing the size of economic units and Is
tending more and more each day to give the
coal and steel market an oligopolistic character;
and whereas the provisions of paragraph
2 of article 65 and of paragraph 2 of article
66 indicate the intention of the authors of
the Treaty not to place any obstacles in the
way of this evolution, on condition that It
serves the ends of the Treaty and that In
particular it leaves intact, between major
units, the amount of competition necessary
to safeguard the fundamental requirement
of article 2, which calls for "the progressive
establishment of conditions which will in
themselves assure the most rational distribution of production at the highest possible
level of productivity, while safeguarding the
continuity of employment and avoiding the
creation of fundamental and persistent disturbances in the economies of the Member
States";
and whereas this preoccupation with safeguarding a certain modicum of competition
in the system of imperfect competition prevailing in the coal and steel industries has
manifestly inspired one of the conditions laid
down in paragraph 2 of article 65 which
have to be fulfiled by joint marketing
agreements if they are to be authorized,
namely that they must not give the enterprises concerned the power to fix prices for

55. 8 Rec. de la jurisprudence de ]a Cour 165.
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miner les prix d'une partie substantielle des
produits en cause dans le march6 commun;
attendu que le Trait6 a W plus loin encore
que Particle 65, dans le souci de ne pas
faire obstacle aux 6volutions indispensables,
puisqu'il a t6 jusqu'i reconnaitre, dans
l'article 95, "qu'un changement profond des
conditions 6conomiques ou techniques" pourrait "rendre n~cessaire une adaptation des
r~gles relatives k l'exercice par la Haute
Autorit6 des pouvoirs qui lui sont confr~s";
attendu que la Haute Autorit6 et le Consell sp6cial de ministres de la Communaut6
europ~enne du charbon et de l'acier ont, en
application de 'article 95, demand6 le 20
juillet 1961, l'avis de la Cour sur un projet
de modification du Trait6, destin6 h parer
aux effets d'un changement fondamental et
persistant des conditions d'6coulement dans
les industries du charbon et de l'acier;
que la Cour a marqu6 dans son avis 1/61
du 13 dcembre 1961:56 "qu'en principe Fartide 95 ne fait pas obstacle k une adaptation
des r~gles relatives aux pouvoirs que l'article
65 conf&re i la Haute Autorit6 par une modification du paragraphe 2 de cet article, visant
& permettre iL la Haute Autorit6 d'autoriser
soit des accords d'une autre nature que ceux
pr~vus par le texte actuel, mais poursuivant
le m~me but, soit des accords de m~me nature que ceux pr~vus par le texte en vigueur,
mais poursuivant un autre but, soit enfin
des accords d'une autre nature et poursuivant
d'autres buts";
que la Cour a ensuite affirm6 "que des
modifications tant de la premiere partie du
ier alin a du paragraphe 2, permettant d'autoriser d'autres categories d'ententes non
pr~vues par le texte en vigueur, que du
littera a du maine paragraphe, visant les
buts des accords susceptibles d'Etre autoris6s,
peuvent constituer une adaptation des r gles
relatives h I'exercice des pouvoirs d'autorisation attribuas b la Haute Autorit6; mais
que, par contre, la suppression du littera c
dapasse le cadre d'une adaptation .. .";
56.

a substantial part of the products in question within the common market;
and whereas the Treaty has gone even
further than article 65 in the desire not to
place any obstacle in the way of indispensable evolutions, since it has gone so far to
recognize, in article 95, that "a profound
change in economic or technical conditions"
might "make necessary an adaptation of
the rules concerning the exercise by the
High Authority of the powers which are
conferred upon it";
and whereas the High Authority and the
Special Council of Ministers of the European
Coal and Steel Community have on July 20,
1961, pursuant to article 95, asked for the
Court's opinion on a plan to modify the
Treaty with a view to counteracting the
effects of a fundamental and persistent
change in marketing conditions in the coal
and steel industries;
and whereas the Court has indicated in
its Opinion 1-61 of December 13, 1961:56
"that in principle article 95 does not constitute an obstacle to an adaptation of the
rules relating to the powers that article 65
confers on the High Authority, by modifying paragraph 2 of that article in such a way
as to permit the High Authority to authorize either agreements of a different nature
from those referred to in the present text
but pursuing the same object, or agreements
of the same nature as those referred to in
the present text but pursuing a different
object, or finally agreements of a different
nature and pursuing different objects";
and whereas the Court then affirmed
"that modifications, either of the opening
words of paragraph 2, enabling categories
of agreements to be authorized other than
those provided for in the present text, or of
letter (a) of the same paragraph, referring
to the objects of agreements likely to be
authorized, may constitute an adaptation of
the rules relating to the exercise of the
powers of authorization conferred on the
High Authority, but that on the other hand
the suppression of letter (c) would go beyond
the scope of an adaptation . . .";

7 Rec. de la jurisprudence de la Cour at 514.
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qu'ainsi ]a Cour a montr6 qu'elle entend,
comme le souhaitent les requ6rantes, "interpr6ter et appliquer les r6gles de droit en
tenant compte de la nouvelle situation 6conomique" et "des nouvelles tfches que pose
le dynamisme de ]a vie 6conomique" ....
attendu que ]a Haute Autorit6 a estim6
que cette dose de concurrence indispensable
6tait sauvegard~e par les trois comptoirs de
vente en commun qu'elle a autoris~s dans
ses d~cisions Nos 5-56, 6-56 et 7-56 du 15
f~vrier 1956, mais qu'elle ne le serait pas par
]a survivance des m~canismes communs autorisks par la d~cision NO 8-56 du 15 f~vrier
1956 et de l'organisation de vente en commun interdite par la d~cision NO 16-60 du
22 juin 1960;
que ]a Cour ne voit aucune raison d'admettre qu'en imposant le maintien d'une
dose minimum de concurrence h l'int~rieur
du bassin de Ia Ruhr, ]a Haute Autorit6 n'a
pas respect6 la lettre et I'esprit du trait6 et
notamment les obligations que lui imposent
les articles 2, 3, 4 et 5.57
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and whereas the Court has shown that It
intends, as the petitioners desire "to interpret and apply the rules of law while taking
account of the new economic situation" and
"of the new tasks imposed by the dynamism
of economic life . . .";
and whereas the High Authority has considered that this indispensable amount of
competition was safeguarded by the three
joint marketing agencies that it authorized
in its decisions 5-56, 6-56 and 7-56 of February 15, 1956, but that it would not be
safeguarded by the continued existence of
the joint mechanisms authorized by decision
8-56 of February 15, 1956, and by the joint
marketing organization prohibited by decision 16-60 of June 22, 1960;
and whereas the Court sees no reason for
holding that by imposing the maintenance
of a minimum amount of competition within
the Ruhr basin the High Authority has not
respected the letter and the spirit of the
Treaty, and in particular the obligations
imposed on it by articles 2, 3, 4 and 5.57

CONCLUSION

A. The Function of Article 85 in the Treaty as a Whole
In order to evaluate the meaning of article 85, it is essential to see it
in relation to the Treaty as a whole, and in particular to the fundamental objectives of the Community as enumerated in article 2 of the
Treaty.
In the conception of the authors of the Treaty, the fusion of the
separate markets-or, in other words, the establishment of a common
market-is one of the two essential conditions for realizing the objects
of the Community, while undistorted competition is a fundamental condition for the success of such a common market. The rules which have to
ensure that the free play of competition within the common market is
not distorted fulfil a derivative, protective function, consisting in preventing the Community's objectives from being frustrated by disturbances in the functioning of the common market caused by distortions
of competition.
57.

8 Rec. de ]a jurisprudence de la Cour at 212-14.
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B. The Interpretation of the Words "prevent, restrict or distort
competition"
In elaborating the basic rule contained in article 3 (f), article 85 (1) is
aimed only at protecting the functioning of the common market from
distorted competition. The complete or partial limitation of competition expressed by the words "prevent" and "restrict" is already comprised within the notion "distort," so that these two terms added to the
word "distort" have no meaning of their own but merely constitute examples of ways in which competition can be distorted.
The concept "distort competition" refers to agreements prejudicial
to the functioning of the common market as a fusion of the separate
markets. It follows that article 85 does not apply to any obstacle to
competition, but only to those obstacles which are incompatible with the
conception of a common market.
C. Meaning of the Word "affect"
The notion "affect trade between Member States" delimits the sphere
of application of the rule that competition within the common market
must not be distorted, and consequently it forms a qualifying element
of that rule. It does not, therefore, constitute an autonomous element
in article 85, but indicates what forms of distortion of competition are
envisaged as being incompatible with the common market.
Though there is little point in going into the question of whether a
neutral or a pejorative meaning should be attributed to the word "affect,"
it seems obvious-having regard, on the one hand, to the position of
the term "affect" in relation to the preponderating notion of "distort"
and, on the other, to the way in which the term "affect" is used in other
articles of the Treaty-that a pejorative meaning should be attributed
to this term.
D. Significance of Article 85(3)
Article 85(3) entrusts the Commission with the task of applying the
Treaty, as regards competition, in its entirety, and of deciding, in specific
cases, whether the objectives of the Community would be better served
by maintaining the unencumbered mechanism of the common market,
or whether those objectives call for this protection of the functioning of
the common market to be set aside.
The exception to the protective rule of article 85(1), or, in other
words, the applicability of article 85(3), therefore concerns only agreements which are so useful for the attainment of the objectives of the
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Treaty that, though they must be judged incompatible with the proper
functioning of the common market, it would be contrary to the fundamental objectives of the Community to prohibit them. Viewed against
the background of the Treaty as a whole, the function of article 85(3)
emphasizes the derivative function of article 85(1) as that of protecting
the functioning of the common market, which, in itself, is only a means
of attaining the objects of the Community.

